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The United States Government (USG) seems to be ready to go ahead with a national missile defense
system against attacks by so-called rogue nation-states, terrorist groups, and other non-state actors.
This readiness has met with much opposition.
Some opponents argue that the "go ahead" will mean the death of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty and that this death will have negative consequences for USG security and for the rest of the
world as well. Support for this position is based on the following: (1) The ABM Treaty is the linchpin of all
nuclear weapons limitation and reduction agreements. As the treaty goes, so do the other agreements.
However, there is no necessary linkage between the one and the others. This is especially the case for
Russia, which will retain the capability to overwhelm the system proposed by the USG. (2) Once a treaty
is signed, it becomes immutable. Changing it renders all agreements of the changer as suspect. The
changer-here the USG-will lose the tool of formal agreement from its security armamenterium.
However, virtually all agreements have conditions under which such agreements can be modified. Even
if they don't, the notion that agreements truly should be immutable even in the face of technological
and political change impinging on security threat would seem to be a greater threat to any political
entity than changing an agreement based on technological and political change.
Other opponents argue that the USG position is largely a maneuver to influence the upcoming US
presidential elections. This political ploy cheapens the nature of USG agreements and leads us back to
the reasoning in (2) above. Still other opponents argue that the USG position is not based on adequate
technical data to support such a position. However, this argument would become moot if such technical
data would exist now or in the future.
The four main arguments against the USG position can be refuted, but their staying power remains.
Could it be that in a world with only one superpower-"hyperpower" to some-there is a psychological
dynamic to malign that superpower's security needs? That a motive to "pull down" the political entity on
the top of the security heap takes precedence over the actual security consequences worldwide? Or a
conservative penchant to be change-aversive-bordering on the superstitious-precludes new thinking in
new situations? Or merely a "business as usual" perspective that will only most grudgingly support or
step out of the way of a legitimate policy initiative for a political payoff? Regardless, the USG position on
its defense seems to be eliciting defensiveness in others-a defensiveness mimicking a negative
transference, a defensiveness that the USG will not need much defense to counter. (See Beckler, E.
(November 6, 1999). U.S. pushes missile defense despite allies' opposition. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com; Castelnuovo-Tedesco, P. (1986). Fear of change as a source of resistance in
analysis. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 14, 259-272; Chertoff, J.M. (1989). Negative oedipal transference of a
male patient to his female analyst during the termination phase. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association, 37, 687-713; Honig, A.M. (1960). Negative transference in psychosis. Psychoanalysis and the
Psychoanalytic Review, 47, 105-114; Weiler, M.A. (1987). Interpretation of negative transference in
nonanalytic settings. International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine, 17, 223-236.)
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